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"THE ALPHABET
OF
NATURE"
Writing as Trope
in
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and
Philosophical Discourse
Nicholas Hudson

To inquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of
•water, of air, is a vain pursuit: but to inquire the forms of
sense, of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of
gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and
all other natures and qualities, "which, like an alphabet, are
not many,and of which the essences (upheld by matter) of all
creatures, do consist;to inquire, I say,the trueforms ofthese,
is that part of metaphysic which we now define of'
Bacon, The Advancement of Learning

' Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, ed. ArthurJohnston (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1974), bk 7, ch. 5, 92.
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Let me on the behalf of the corpuscularians apply to the
origin of qualities a comparison of theold atomistsimployed
by Lucretius, and others, to illustrate the production of an
infinite number of bodies, from such simple fragments of
matter as they thought atomsto be. For since of the 24 letters
ofthe alphabet associated several ways, as to the numberand
placing of the letters, all the words of the several languages of
the world may be made; so, say these naturalists, by vari
ously connecting such and such numbers of atoms, of such
shapes and motions,into masses orconcretions, an innumer
able multitude ofdifferent bodies may be formed.^
Boyle, The Origin of Forms and Qualitie
Nor will it be thought strange to think these few simple ideas
sufficient to employ thequickest thought, or largest capacity;
and to furnish the materials of all that various knowledge,
and more various knowledge, and more various fanciesand
opinions, of all mankind, if we consider how many words
can be made out ofthe various composition of twenty-four
letters.^
Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding
Do not the Chinese have articulate sounds, just as we do?
And yet, since they have adopted a different system of
writing, it has not occurred to them to make an alphabet of
these sounds. It is inthat way that many things are possessed
without the possessors knowing it.*
Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding

he above passages share a metaphor—the metaphor of
(
nature or the mind as an "alphabet" of discrete
^
^
elements. It is an image that pervades early modern
scientific and philosophical discourse, from Bacon's "abecediarum

^ Robert Boyle, Works, ed. Thomas Birch,6 vols. (London, 1772; facs. repr.; Hildesheim:Georg
Olms, 1965-66), 2:298. My italics.
' John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975), bk. 2, ch. 8,132.
* Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Hew Essays on the Understanding, trans. Peter Remnant and
Jonathan Bennet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), bk. 1, ch. 1, 84.
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naturae" to Leibniz's "alphabetum cogitationum humanarum." What
can this metaphor tell us about the discourse of the scientific revolution
and its relation to other fields of the same period? It can hardly be a
coincidence that the alphabet became a central metaphor in an age of
expanding literacy, and at a time when European authors widely praised
writing as the greatest invention in history, the mark Western superior
ity to non-literate nations discovered and colonized throughout the
world. "Above all stupendous inventions" [Sopra tutte le invenzione
stupende],' as Galileo called it, the alphabet formed an important link
between the material conditions of his age and its development of new
kinds of scientific discourse.
This is not to claim that philosophers and scientists of the
seventeenth century were the first to use the alphabet as a metaphor. As
authors of this period were well aware, the "alphabet of nature" had a
long pedigree stretching back to classical philosophy. The locus classicus
of this metaphor was Lucretius's De rerum naturae, where the Roman
poet used alphabetical letters as an illustration for his atomistic
philosophy of nature. As I will argue, moreover, Lucretius's image is
connected with an essentially erroneous understanding of the relation
between writing and speech. These views, common among Roman
grammarians, continued to prevail right though the Renaissance and
into the seventeenth century, when the ancient atomism of Lucretius
enjoyed a historic revival. In short, the "alphabet of nature" embodies
an important connection between analogous conceptions of language
and nature. This image indicates how the prevalence of a certain form
of scientific or philosophical discourse may rely on certain common
assumptions about the nature of language.
Let us begin by situating "the alphabet of nature" within the
tradition of metaphors connected with books and writing—that great
treasure-trove of imagery well-known as "the Book of Nature." As
recent studies have shown, the image of nature as a great "book"
evolved largely in distinction from the Holy Scriptures.^ It was God's

' Galileo Galilei, Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems,trans. Stillman Drake, 2°'* ed.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), first day, 105. See also Diologo sopra i due
massimi sistemi del mondo,in Opere, 20 vols. (Pirenze: G. Barbera, 1929-39), 7:130-1.
' See Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willian R.
Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 319-26; Erich Rotacker, Das "Buch der Natur":
Materialien und Grundsatzliches zurMetaphemgeschichte, rev. Wilhelm Perpeet (Bonn; Bouvier
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"other text," written not in the dead letters of human invention, but in
divine "letters" and symbols. This image has been most dominant in a
mystical tradition generally skeptical of book-learning and bibliolatry.
For authors of the late Renaissance such as Paracelsus or Jacob Boehme,
the divine writing or "signatures" in nature constituted a script invisible
to the proud and worldly, though decipherable to all those, literate and
illiterate, who genuinely sought the truth. Hence, the "book of nature"
has conventionally implied both anti-materialism and what Jacques
Derrida called "logocentrism"—the distrust of writing and the tendency
to privilege speech as more immediate and truthful than its visible
"copy."^ As I have argued at length elsewhere, however, Derrida was
wrong to indicate that hostility to writing has generally characterized
Western thought.' There has been strong tradition in Western thought
that has celebrated writing as a symbol of progress and reason—and it
is within this tradition that "the alphabet of nature" has generally
flourished.
In the medieval Jewish tradition of cabalism, for example, creation
itself was thought to have consisted, before Genesis, of the disordered
letters of the Hebrew alphabet, which then fell into place to form both
the universe and the Torah. Every letter and point of the Torah
contained some sacred significance discovered through the various
recombinations of its letters according to the secret arts of the cabala.'
Cabalism no doubt exercised an important influence on the medieval
Christian philosopher Raymond Lull, who lived near the source of this
tradition in the Sephardic culture of thirteenth-century Spain. In Lull's
system, letters stand for various properties, accidents and differences,
which he then systematically combined in all possible ways on wheels
and tables. By this means, he hoped to shorten and ultimately perfect
the conventional Aristotelian analysis of predication. Lull shared the
cabalistic conviction that nature could be examined by means of the

Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1979).
' Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravony Spivak (Baltimore and
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
' See Nicholas Hudson, Writing and European Thought, 1600-1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 161-66 and passim.
' See Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken Books,
1961), 76; Leo Schaya, The Universal Meaning of Kabbalah, trans. Nancy Pearson (London:
Gerge Allen and Unwin, 1971), 18.
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text itself, and that first-hand knowledge of nature held no privileged
position in the examination of the pursuit of knowledge. Like the
cabalists, Lull found no conflict between the "dead" letter of Scripture
or scholarship and the living language of God in nature. Writing held
a sacred and central position in the investigation of truth.'®
This secular orientation has been epitomized by materialist and
atomist philosophy, where the alphabet has been among the dominant
and revealing metaphors of nature. In De rerum naturae, Lucretius
repeatedly cites the alphabet to illustrate what might otherwise seem
the most contestable idea of a strictly materialist understanding of
natural phenomena: that the vast diversity of this world might arise
from the combination of a relatively small number of basic elements.
This seemed to be the possibility revealed by alphabetical writing. Just
as all the languages of the world derived, it seemed, from the various
combination of some twenty-four letters, so all the objects of the world
are formed by the arrangement of atoms of various shapes, sizes and
motion:
the same elements compose sky, sea, lands, rivers and sun,
crops, trees, and animals, but they are moving differently and
in different combinations. Consider how in my verses, for
instance, you see many letter common to many words; yet
you must admit that different verses and words differ in
substance and audible sound. So much can be accomplished
by letters through mere change of order. But the elements
can bring more factors into play so as to create things in all
their variety."
Lucretius's poem is permeated by a generalfascination with alphabetical
writing and its importance as a model for nature. Its significance, for
him, lay in the discovery of how an apparently orderly system, such as
speech or nature, could in fact arise through a random process. He
considered language to be an institution of such complexity that it

See Ramon Lull, An Brevis, in Selected Works, ed. Anthony Bonner, 2 vols. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985).
" Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. Ronald Latham (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1951), bk. 1, 51.
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could never have been deliberately contrived by primitive humans; it
must have evolved, rather, in a natural and undirected way beginning
with spontaneous cries and gestures. Order finally prevailed in language
because its components, as isolated by the alphabet, were universal to
all human beings. The alphabet, that is, exemplified the central paradox
of Lucretian physics: that a random process could give rise to order
because the basic elements of that process were limited and consistent.
Speech and nature seem so orderly not because of some higher
intelligent design, but because they consist of a limited number of basic
components—atoms and letters.
Behind Lucretian atomism, therefore, lay a certain understanding
of language typical of his epoch. In Greek and Roman grammar, the
letters were regarded as the discrete units that made up speech, "pars
minima vocis articulae."^^ They were indeed like the "elements" or
"atoms" of language. Significantly, the same Greek word, "stoicheion,"
meant both letter and physical element. Similarly, Roman grammarians
liked to call letters "atomos."" Thus the analogy between writing and
the physical universe could work both ways. If Lucretius defended his
atomistic theories by an analogy to alphabetical letters, so the Roman
grammarians used atomism as an analogy to explain the nature of
elements. Even before the ascendance of "print culture," written
language strongly influenced the understanding of speech. Alphabetical
writing makes speech seem like a sequence of vocal units, and encour
ages the confusion between written and spoken "letters" that character
ized classical grammar. Even Priscian, an enlightened grammarian who
made an effort to distinguish between letters {littera) and vocal units
(elementa), confused the two throughout the treatise that followed.
Like other grammarians of his epoch, he habitually had in mind written
language even when examining the nature of articulation.''*
This confusion continued and even intensified in the Renaissance,
when the humanist preoccupation with rhetoric and linguistic arts was
intensified by the influence of print, a medium that strengthened (but

" Priscian, Institutionum Grammaticarum, in Heinrich Keil, ed., Grammatici Latini, 8 vols.
(Hildersheim: Gerg Olms, 1961), 2:6.
" See Sergius, De littera de syllaba depedibus de accentibus de distinctionecommentarius, in Keil
ed., Grammatici Latini, 4:475.
" On this confusion in Priscian's era and later, see David Abercrombie, "What Is a 'Letter'?" in
Studies in Phonetics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 76-85.
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did not create) the tendency to understand language in visual terms.
The work of MacLuhan, Ong and Eisenstein has made us sharply
conscious of the ways in which, as McLuhan wrote, "the forms of
experience and of mental outlook and expression have been modified,
first by the phonetic alphabet and then by printing." Ong focused on
the Renaissance logician Ramus, who "developed the habit of regarding
everything, mental and physical, as components of little corpuscular
units and 'simples.'"*^ In the background to this corpuscularian
approach to problems were, again, important developments in the study
of language. European grammarians sought to improve their languages,
and to make spelhng a truer "picture" of speech. Orthographic
reformers in England, such as John Hart and Thomas Smith, envisioned
the creation of a complete phonetic transcription of speech for ordinary
use. The same ambition inspired the work of many seventeenthcentury grammarians, including Robert Robinson, Charles Butler, and
William Holder, who hoped to create a complete alphabet of all human
speech sounds. Holder's references to a "Natural Alphabet" underlying
all language reveals the assumption of all these authors: speech, they
believed, consists fundamentally of a limited number of vocal elements.
Holder, for example, counted exactly thirty-six consonants and thirtynine vowels.'^
As in the classical era, then, an "atomistic" view of speech
encouraged an atomistic view of the world. Scientists and philosophers
imagined nature as an "alphabet" of basic components.'^ At this point.

"MarshallMcLuhan, 7ii)eG«£enfergGii//ax5'(Toronto:TorontoUniversityPress,1962), 1. See
also Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, 2 vols. (Cambridge;
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
" Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1958), 203.
" On these developments, see Nicholas Hudson, Writing and European Thought, 1600-1830
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 91-103; D. G. Scragg, A History of English
Spelling (Manchester: Manchester University Press; New York: Barnes and Novel, 1974); F.H.
Brengelman, "Orthoepists, Printers, and the Rationalization of English Spelling."/oama/ of
English and Germanic Philology70 (1980): 332-54.
" On this connection between atomism and language, see Richard W. F. Kroll, The Material
Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UniversityPress, 1991), 11-12. More generally on seventeenth-century atomism, see
Robert Hugh Kargon, Atomism in Englandfrom Harlot to Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1966); Arnold Thackray, Atoms and Powers: An Essay on Newtonian Matter-Theory and the
Development of Chemistry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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however, we should step back and consider the real nature of language,
as revealed by research since the seventeenth century. It is important
to see that the view exemplified by grammarians like Holder (what
David Abercrombie has called "the building-block" theory) essentially
misrepresents the real nature of speech. For, as Roy Harris has
observed, speech does not consist of a sequence of vocal atoms; rather,
it is "essentially a continuous series of infinitely numerous sounds.""
Alphabetical writing denotes characteristic points in this transforma
tions of vocal sound and the fluid movements of the vocal apparatus
from position to position. Each symbol of the alphabet corresponds not
to a single sound, but to a range of sounds, called a "phoneme" by
modern linguists, recognized by speakers of a language to be "signifi
cant." No alphabet, not even a modern phonetic alphabet, can claim to
be a complete transcription of all the vocal sounds in a language.
Rather, alphabets record, imperfectly, those kinds of sound that
speakers identify as important to meaning: they do not "transcribe"
vocal sound but represent a separate and autonomous system of
communication.^"
For grammarians of the early modern era, however, this concept
of writing was quite alien. They thought of writing as, ideally, a
"picture" of speech, and considered every deviation from this standard
a defect in present scripts. It is true that views on the nature of vocal
sound were changing: with increasing knowledge of phonetics,
grammarians late in the century, such as John Wilkins, began to doubt
the possibility of creating a script that mirrored speech in all its
complexity.^' Still later, in the middle of the next century, Samuel
Johnson criticized "penmen" who naively believed that the "boundless
chaos of living speech" could be reduced to a consistent orthographic
system. Dismissing orthographic reform as the defunct preoccupation
of Stuart England, Johnson generally maintained conventional spellings,
" Roy Harris, The Origin of Writing (London: Duckworth, 1986), 114.
The leading theorist of our age on the nature of writing and its relation tospeech is the Czech
linguist Josef Vachek, whose major papers are collected in Written Language Revisted,ed. Philip
A. Luelsdorff (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1989). See also Dwight L.
Bolinger, "Visual Moerphemes," Language 22 (1946): 333-40; William Haas, Phonographic
Transcription (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 1970); NaomiS. Baron, Speech,Writing
andSipi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 149-200.
"John Wilkins, ri « EssayTowards a Real Characterand a Philosophical Language(London, 1668),
365.
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correctly seeing that writing could not be transformed into a mirror of
speech, as reformers hoped7^ But Johnson exemplifies the discoveries
of a later era: in the seventeenth century, on the contrary, scholars were
inspired by an essentially "alphabetical" model of both language and
nature—by the possibility, that is, of reducing the apparently endless
complexity of things to a relatively small number of elements.
This belief, as I have indicated, represents a tradition in Western
thought that dates back at least to classical atomism and grammar. Yet
the "New Science" is much more than a revival of ancient ideas: "the
alphabet of nature" was refashioned to fit the assumptions of a new era
influenced by experimental science and Christianity. That Christianity
contributed a new element in scientific discourse may seem surprising.
Yet it is precisely a Christian conviction in divine direction that
distinguished Robert Boyle's use of the "alphabet of nature"image from
its classical uses. Boyle agreed with Lucretius that all the phenomena
of nature arise from the combination of atoms in various shapes and
positions. Nevertheless, he rejected the belief of classical atomists that
matter is self-moving, a doctrine he connected with their atheism: "not
acknowledging an Author of the universe," says Boyle, "they were
thereby reduced to making motion cognate to matter.Boyle
dismissed the idea that a mere random concourse of atoms could form
the universe, adding belief in a designing God to the ancient philosophy
of Lucretius. For Boyle's contemporaries, similarly, this need for some
grand intelligent order differentiated modern atomism from its classical
precedents. According to John Ray, it was as absurd to believe that a
world of such intricate order could occur through a random play of
atoms as to imagine that the "innumerable Figures of the one and
twenty Letters" could be dropped from a high place and form the text
of "Ennius's Annals."^* These seventeenth-century scientists thus
insisted on the essential orderliness of both language and the physical
world. The "alphabet of nature" became an image not merely of a

^ Samuel Johnson, A Grammar of the English Tongue, in A Dictionary of the English Language
(London, 1775), sigs. a2'"'. On Johnson's views concerning orthographic reform, see Allen
Reddick, The Making of Johnson's Dictionary 1746-1773 (Cambridge; Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 19-20; Hudson, Writing and European Thought, 100-103.
" Boyle, The Ori^n of Forms and Qualities, in Works, 3:15.
"John Ray, The Wisdom of God, manifested in the Works ofthe Creation {2°'' ed. London, 1692),
part 1, 22.
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consistent elemental basis of all phenomena but also of the need for
design and intelligence.
Other authors of this age carried the alphabet metaphor even
further from its significance in classical literature. It is highly doubtful,
for example, that Francis Bacon can be associated with the same
atomistic conception of nature as found in Lucretius. For Bacon, the
alphabet embodied, above, all, an outstanding example of a methodologi
cal approach to the problem of studying nature. In the passage that
begins this essay, for example, Bacon asserts that it is "vain" to imagine
the "forms" of objects like lions or oaks or gold; rather, one must
consider "the natures and qualities, which, like an alphabet are not
many. But his intention was not to deny the existence of "forms." He
agreed with Medieval philosophers that the final goal of science was to
determine the general nature or "form" each species. Where he
disagreed with scholastic thinkers was on the nature of these forms,
which he considered not immaterial additions to prima materia but
material "forms of sense" such as gravity, levity, density and "all other
natures and qualities." These natures and properties constituted the
"alphabet" of nature. The "Great Instauration" must begin, like the
education of a child, with learning this alphabet, and should move only
gradually towards the end of speaking the language of nature. The
process was, indeed, linguistic as well as epistemological: the errors
caused by faulty nature of words, "Idols of the Marketplace," could be
rectified only be remaking language from scratch.^'
Hence Bacon's "ABECEDARIUM NATURAE," a proposed
system of notation in which alphabetical letters stand for individual
properties. This system recalls Lull's ars hrevis, though Bacon, unlike his
medieval predecessor, wished to combine his system of notation with
actual empirical research. The letters in his system would be used to
stand for the results of experimental investigation, and their recombi
nation to forecast the results of future experiments.^^ Although Bacon

" 'Bicon,AdvancementofLearning, hkTfCh.5, 92.
On Bacon's viewson languageand the"alphabet of nature,"see Richard Foster ]ones, Ancients
and Modems: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth-Century England (St.
Louis: Washington University Press, 1961), 57-9; Peter Urbach, Francis Bacon's Philosophy of
Science: An Account and a Reappraisal (La Salle; Open Court, 1987), 69-71.
Bacon, The Alphabet of Nature, in Works, eds. J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath
(London: Longman, 1870), 5:208-11.
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never completed his plan for this notation, his interest in a new writing
would help to spark many projects for a "real character" during the
remainder of the century. These schemes fell roughly into two sorts:
first kind used symbols to denote objects and concepts without any
reference to speech, a system that Bacon compared in The Advancement
of Learning to hieroglyphics or Chinese characters. This was the
method taken up in England by Francis Lodwick and later by John
Wilkins in the century's most ambitious project for a new language. An
Essay towards a Real Character (1668). The second kind of system was
closer to Bacon's "ABECEDARIUM NATURAE," using an "alphabet"
of letters or marks to denote the basic elements of all objects or
concepts. This was the inspiration for George Dalgarno's Ars Signorum
(1661). Dalgarno began his treatise with a phonetic analysis of speech,
hoping like others to form a complete and accurate alphabet of speech
sounds. The letters of this alphabet would then each symbolize a
property, accident or difference—the division he carried on from
Aristotelian and scholastic metaphysics. This notation would be
ordered both to reflect the real order of concepts in the mind. It could
also be pronounced in a new philosophical speech.
It was not long after Dalgarno's Ars Signorum that Leibniz began
to think of his own philosophical notation inspired, in part, by the
alphabet. This was the "alphabetum cogitationum humanarum," or
what he named more briefly, a "general characterisitic," a kind of
mental calculus in which every element of thought was symbolized by
a mark. Once human thought had been fully analyzed and transcribed,
every possible combination of ideas could be discovered and recorded.^'
The potential of this new "alphabetum" seemed so great to Leibniz that
he wondered why "no mortal has essayed so great a thing."^ He
envisioned that philosophers would have a tool equally powerful as the
telescope or microscope for enlarging and understanding the mind.
Thinking could be brought under the control of science in a way no
longer subject to the uncertainties of individual self-reflection, but
would be made more objective, public and systematic. This scheme so

^ See Leibniz, "Of the Art of Combination" (1666), in Logical Papers, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
" Leibniz, "On the General Characteristic" (c. 1679), in Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed.
Leroy E. Loemaker, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 1:341-42
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strongly recalls Bacon's "ABECEDARIUM NATURAE" that one
might wonder whether he knew of the English philosopher's unpub
lished fragment on this system of notation. But any direct influence is
unlikely: Leibniz's immediate inspiration was, rather, a letter from
Descartes to his friend Mersenne speculating on the potential usefulness
of having a way of symbolizing "les idees simples."^" Leibniz made
copious notes on a copy of this letter.^' Like Descartes, he saw a crucial
link between the model of alphabetical writing and the nature of the
mind. Just as letters were combined in speech to make up all possible
words and sentences, so ideas constituted the basic elements of thought.
Leibniz's system reveals an important new application of the
alphabet of nature. Whereas Lucretius or Boyle used the alphabet to
represent material phenomena, Leibniz saw how the same model might
be applied to the mind. And, in this manner, he anticipated the work
of a philosopher who would become his ideological opponent, John
Locke. Locke argued similarly that all possible ideas in the understand
ing consisted of a relatively small number of basic elements. The
alphabet seemed to prove, again, that phenomena of incredible diversity
and complexity could derive from simple components. As Locke urged,
having defended his thesis that all knowledge consists primarily of
"simple ideas": "Nor will it be thought so strange, to think these few
simple Ideas sufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest
Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledge,
and more various Fancies and Opinions of Mankind, if we consider how
many Words may be made out of the various composition of 24
Letters."'^ Like Leibniz, then, Locke was presenting an "alphabetum
cogitationum humanarum." Where he differed from Leibniz was on the
source of this alphabet. Leibniz viewed the "alphabet" of ideas as
inherent to the mind in the same way that letters are inherent to speech:
his mental "alphabet" would merely uncover what was already there, in
the same way, he supposed, that the Chinese speak in the same letters
as Europeans though they lack an alphabetical script. "Do not the
Chinese have articulate sounds like we do.'" he asked, "And yet, since
See Rene Descartes, letter to Marin Mersenne, 20 November 1629, in Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam
and P. Tanney, 11 vols. (Paris; Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1964-86), 1:79-80.
" On the influence of Descartes and others on Leibniz's notation, see Jonathan Cohen, "On
the Project of a Universal Character," Mind n.s. 63 (1954): 49-63.
LocVe, Essiry concerning Human Understanding, 132.
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they have adopted a different system of writing, it has not yet occurred
to them to make an alphabet of these sounds."'' Locke stressed, on the
contrary, that the "letters" constituting mental phenomena are
"imprinted" on the mind by means of experience. He treated writing
and print as images of active inscription on the blank page or tablet of
the mind.
Locke's image of the senses marking or "imprinting" the under
standing derives from that very long tradition of tropes, dating back to
Aristotle, representing the mind as a "tabula rasa." The imagery of
printing and "impressions" nonetheless suggests how conceptions of
mind were being influenced by the "Age of Print." Among philoso
phers who later developed Lockean empiricism, this background
becomes even more obvious. David Hartley made the image of mental
"impressions" a quite literal description of sensory knowledge. Sensory
perceptions, he believed, made an actual physical mark on the substance
of the brain just as print makes letters on a blank page. This observation
led Hartley to the now well-worn analogy between letters and ideas:
"as this Coalescence of simple Ideas into complex ones is thus evinced,
both by the foregoing Theory, and by Observation, so it may be
illustrated, and farther confirmed, by the similar Coalescence of Letters
into Syllables and Vowels, in which Association is likewise a chief
Instrument."" Hartley exemplifies in the most vivid way the link
between print culture and a certain approach to mental phenomena: he
imagined the mind as, quite literally, a print shop preserving the traces
of sensory experience.
It would be difficult to prove, however, that Hartley was really
aware of his own debt to print culture. In this respect, our understand
ing of intellectual history differs from that of writers in the past:
philosophers and scientists of the early modern era showed little
awareness that they had been drawn towards certain ways of imagining
and describing the world and the naind by the very experience of print
culture. They saw that the alphabet served as an important model for
natural phenomena, but they did not go on to remark that non-literate
societies would therefore be unable to make the same discoveries. It is

" Leibniz, tiew Essays, bk. 1, ch. 1,84.
" David Hartley, Observations on Man (London, 1749; Gainesville: Scholars Facsimiles, 1966),
75.
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true, as I have argued elsewhere, that belief in the inherent difference
between literate and non-literate culture was beginning to emerge
during the eighteenth century." Generally speaking, however, the
insights of McLuhan, Ong or Havelock belong to our time and not the
early modern era. Bacon, Locke, Leibniz and Hartley used the alphabet
as the model of their studies without any evident awareness that they
themselves exemplified a modern literate consciousness.
Indeed, the connection between literacy and developments in
scientific discourse is less exact than might be imagined. It would be
difficult to maintain that the increasing literacy of society promotes, in
the same proportion, more "literate" ways of understanding nature and
the mind. For the "alphabet of nature" declined in importance even as
literacy spread and the Age of Print dominated European culture. In
science and philosophy, as in studies of language, thinkers relied less on
the assumption that either nature or mind could be reduced to a
complete set of elements. Atomism of a new kind was revived by
Dalton and Bohr in later decades. But the reaction of Enlightenment
thinkers to atomism and its associated metaphors generally stressed the
need to avoid a deceptively reductive approach to nature. Scientists and
philosophers increasingly stressed the changing and interconnected
quality of natural phenomena—the need to examine the whole rather
than just the parts. And this change corresponded with trends in the
study of language that elevated syntax over semantics. According this
new outlook, the meaning of a sentence was greater than merely the
sum of its individual words.
Once again, there are precedents for this reasoning in classical
literature, particularly in the work of Plato. While seeing the possible
importance of the alphabet as a model of philosophical investigation,
Plato also recognized the dangers and limitations of this analogy.
Where he does utilize the image of the alphabet, it is in a way that
should not be confused with its use in Lucretius or other authors in the
atomistic tradition. In the Philebus,for example, Socrates describes the
legendary invention of the alphabet by Theuth, an Egyptian "god" or
"godhke man." According to this story, Theuth distinguished vowels

"See Nicholas Hudson, "'Oral Tradition': The Evolution of an Eighteenth-Century Concept,"
in Alvaro Ribeiro, SJ and James G. Basker, Tradition in Transition: Women Writers, Marginal
Texts and the Eighteenth-Century Canon (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1996), 161-76.
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from consonants from mutes, and "in the end he found a number of the
things, and affixed to the whole collection, as to each single member of
it, the name 'letter.'" But Socrates does not cite the alphabet as a
metaphor for the reduction of any object to its constituents. Rather, he
sees Theuth's discovery as showing how "none of us could ever get to
know one of the collection all by itself, in isolation from all the rest."'^
The letter is not, by his definition, an "element" but rather a "bond of
unity," for one sound is known only in relation to other sounds. The
sound < a > or < b >, for example, has significance only in so far as we
know its place in the whole range of sounds in speech and their
combinations. And the same method may be applied to other fields of
knowledge: to grasp any subject, that is, we must know both the
particulars and the whole. The particulars gain significance only as parts
of this unity.
For Plato, then, the alphabet is useful as a model not of reduction
but of combination. This is again how he uses this image in the Sophist,
where the alphabet is cited to illustrate the "blending" of the Forms.
Some Forms, argues theStranger, combine whilesome do not:Rest will
combine with Whiteness or Beauty but not with Motion, and the same
is the case, as he indicates, "with the letters of the alphabet." As he
explains, the alphabet is governed by certain principles of combination:
"some of these [letters] cannot be conjoined; others will fit together."'^
In the Theaetetus, Socrates considers more formally the method of
achieving knowledge by the reduction of any complex object to its
components. He agrees that "elements in general yield knowledge that
is much clearer than knowledge of the complex and more effective for
a complete grasp of anything we seek to know." But the reduction to
elements, while helpful to complete knowledge of a thing, is not
sufficient. Hesiod's description of a wagon as "a hundred pieces of
wood" is inadequate for understanding wagons, just as listing the
individual syllables of the name "Theaetetus" are inadequate for
knowing that name. Beyond the knowledge of the elements, one must
know how these components are combined or ordered. And even this

" Plato, Philebus 18c, in Colleaed Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns,
Bollingen Series LXXI (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1094.
" Sophist 253a, in Colleaed Dialogues, 998.
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knowledge is short of a "correct belief," which must understand not
only the object itself but also its difference from other objects.^'
Not surprisingly, the Platonic tradition in Western philosophy has
not generally found much use for the alphabet as a model or metaphor.
More useful to this tradition have been kinds of ideographic and
mystical scripts that communicate the essential unity of the Forms and
their distance from common knowledge. Hence the deep fascination
with cryptology, cabalism, and hieroglyphics that characterized
Renaissance neo-platonism from Ficino to Kircher.^' Different scripts,
that is, came to represent different philosophies. Hieroglyphics and
various exotic scripts tended to preoccupy thinkers in the so-called
"hermetic-cabalistic" tradition of the Renaissance, whereas the alphabet,
as we have seen, became closely associated with the philosophy and
methodology of the New Science.
Even in the New Science, however, doubts began accumulate
concerning an "alphabetical" methodology that tended to make the
discovery of components the primary object of science, and that failed
to recognize that the whole is greater than its parts. These doubts arose
during the same decades that new views of language began to predomi
nate in grammar and philosophy. Increasingly, the preoccupation with
the individual units that make language gave way to an awareness of
how meaning derives from the interrelation of words in sentences and
in particular contexts.
As Murray Cohen affirmed, this was "the major difference between
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century ideas of language: in the earlier
period the basic linguistic unit was the letter, sound, syllable, or word;
later, it is the syntactical function."''" This difference might be illustrated
by considering the difference between Locke and later authors on the
nature of meaning. Locke thought of meaning as the composite product

" Theaetetus 206b-208a, in Collected Dialogues, 914-16.
" On the importance of hieroglyphic5 in the hermetic tradition of the Renaissance, see Karl
Giehlow, "Die Hieroglphenkunde des Humanismus," Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen
Sammlungen des Allerhdchsten Kaiserhauses 32 (1915): 1-218; Frances A Yates, Giordano Bruno
and the Hermetic Tradition (London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 163-66; Erik Iversen,
The Myth of Egypt and its Hieroglyphs (Copenhagen: Gee Gad, 1961), 57-87. On cabalism, see
Joseph Leon Blau, The Christian Interpretation of the Cahala in the Renaissance (Port
Washington: Kennikat Press, 1944).
Murray Cohen, Sensible Words: Linguistic Practice in England 1640-1783 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1977), 51.
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of all the "simple ideas" combined into mental proposition, which
became the basis of the sentence. He hardly knew how to explain
"particles" such as conjunctions and prepositions, which seemed to
signify no individual idea but rather "some Action or Intimation of
Mind.""" Prepositions, conjunctions, articles and such words seemed
difficult to explain in Locke's philosophy, for he assumed that every
word should correspond to a discrete "idea." What "idea" is signified by
"on" or "but" or "the"? In the mid and late eighteenth century,
however, authors such as Adam Smith and John Horne-Tooke focused
particularly in the importance of such "particles."'*^ They and other
philosophers began to give both logical and temporal priority to the
sentence over the word. According to the Abbe Condillac, language
originally "decomposed" whole concepts into their parts; it transferred
meanings that are essentially unified to a linear and segmented form.
For this reason, individual words cannot be fully meaningful except as
they belong to sentences and correspond with other parts to form
whole thoughts.'*^ A related development in linguistic philosophy
concerned the dependence of meaning on context. George Berkeley
observed that "a word pronounced with certain circumstances, or in a
certain context with other words, hath not always the same import and
signification that it hath when pronounced in some other circumstances
or different context words."'*'* Berkeley questioned as well whether any
single word signified a discrete idea, for many words stand for emotions
or concepts that cannot be clearly visualized ("grace," "force").'*'

" Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, bk 3, chap. 7, 472.
See Adam Smith, Considerations concerning thefirst formation of languages (1761), in Lectures
on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. J. C. Bryce (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 205-15; John
Horne-Tooke, The Diversions ofPurley, 2 vols. (2"* ed. London, 1798), part 1, ch. 2; pt. 2, ch. 6
and 7.
" On the use of language to "decompose" or "analyse" thought, a good description in
Condillac's work is in his Logic, in Philosophical Writings, trans. Franklin Philip and Harlan
Lane, 2 vols. (Hillsdale and London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982-87), 1:388-95. See also Hans
Aarsleff, "The Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the
Eighteenth Century and the Debate of the Berlin Academy before Herder," in From Locke to
Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual History (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1982), 157-58.
^ George Berkeley, An Essay towardsa New Theory of Vision, in Works,ed. G. N. Wright, 2 vols.
(London: Thomas Tegy, 1843), 1:260.
See Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), in Works, 1:494.
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For these philosophers of language and mind, the "alphabet" (as
cited by Locke, Hartley and others) had ceased to be a suitable
metaphor. They needed new tropes that expressed their common
emphasis on the interconnected nature of all thoughts and words. The
image that presented itself to many philosophers of the mid and late
eighteenth century was the "web" and related metaphors of fabric,
tissues and networks. In his prize-winning essay on the origin of
language, Abhandlung uber den Ursprung der Spracbe (1772), Johann
Gottfried Herder used these images to convey the fundamentally
interwoven nature of all experience and all the senses. Like Condillac,
Herder believed that language separated and ordered thoughts and
sensations that were originally unified, for "in nature all the threads are
one single tissue."'*^ In sharp contrast with philosophers like Locke and
Hartley, moreover. Herder rejected any concept of "simple ideas,"
denoted by a lexicon of similarly discrete words. "The woven texture
called human nature," as he wrote, was "in all its parts a texture for
language."''^ The same image was developed by Wilhelm von Hum
boldt in his classic study of language typology, published in 1836:
Language can be compared to an immense web, in which
every part stands in a more or less clearly recognizable
connection with the other, and all with the whole. Whatever
his point of departure, man always makes contact in speaking
with a mere isolated portion of this fabric.'*'
Humboldt regarded each language as fundamentally unified by a
common principle or methodology for giving expression to our
thoughts. Like Herder, he rejected an "alphabetical" model of mind
that, in the manner of Descartes or Leibniz, focused narrowly on the
relation between words (or symbols) and ideas. Furthermore, these
developments were not exclusive to studies of language and mind, but
have important parallels in the practice and language of science. In
common with philosophers, scientists began to reject the simple
Johann Gottfried Herder, On the Origin of Language,in John H. Moran and Alexander Gode,
eds., On the Oripn of Language (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1966), seaion 3,140-41.
Herder, On the Origin of Language, seaion 3,146-47.
" Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language,trans. Paer Heath (Cambridge:Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 69.
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reductivism of earlier eras associated with atomism and the image of
nature as a great "alphabet." Even one of the founders of modern
atomic chemistry, Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, questioned whether the
discovery of primary elements should preoccupy research, at least as
this goal had been understood by previous generations. In his Traite
elementaire de chemie (1789), Lavoisier admitted that "it will, no doubt,
be a matter of surprise, that a treatise upon the elements of chemistry,
there should be no chapter on the constituent and elementary parts of
matter."'" But the history of science, he contended, showed the
inefficacy of methods that relied on the identification of elements:
All that can be said upon the number and nature of elements
is, in my opinion, confined to discussions entirely of a
metaphysical nature. The subject only furnishes us with
indefinite problems, which may be solved in a thousand
different ways, not one of which, in all probability, is
consistent with nature.'"
At best, we should regard scientific elements as provisional instruments
for analysis, recognizing at all times the possibility of further division
and revision. According to this approach, a "element" stands not for a
component in nature itself, but rather "the last point which analysis is
capable of reaching." As Arnold Thackray argued, this kind of caution
was widely shared by eighteenth-century chemists, a scepticism he
attributes to the influence of Newtonian optics: "the net effect of
Newton's work on white light...was to suggest to all Newtonianinspired chemists that a deep gulf lay between chemical elements and
the ultimate physical atoms. Chemists might wish to learn of the latter,
but they must of necessity be content with knowledge of the former.""
The most controversial aspect of Dalton's theories in the early
nineteenth century was indeed that he reaffirmed the identity between
"chemical element" and "atom" rejected by Lavoisier and others.

Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier,Elements ofChemistry (1789),trans. Robert Kerr (Edinburgh,1790;
facs. repr. New York: Dover, 1965), xxii.
Lavoisier, Elements of Chemistry, xxiv.
" Thickiiy, Atoms and Powers,184. See also A. R. Hall, The Scientific Revolution ISOO-ISOO
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1956), 322-38.
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For Lavoisier, as for Berkeley, Herder or Humboldt, the alphabet
had simply lost its usefulness as a metaphor. For scientists, as for these
other thinkers, the web presented itself as a suitable alternative to
suggest the fundamentally complex and interconnected nature of the
world. In biology, for example, new generations of writers jettisoned
the old models that made all species seem discrete and unchanging. The
image of nature as a great web was suggested in 1750 by the Italian
biologist Vitaliano Donati. It was taken up a few years later by Peter
Simon Pallas, who used the image of a great tree to symbolize, in the
words of a recent historian, "the complicated relations found to exist
among the multifarious objects of natural history."'^ Here, of course,
we find the origins of our language of ecosystems and biological
interdependence. Like scholars of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, we have increasingly stressed the unity and
interconnection of all things, rejecting a simplistic outlook that sees all
natural objects in isolation from all others.
In the periodic table and other familiar institutions in modern
science, "the alphabet of nature" has continued to influence the way
that we think and speak about the world. But as a general metaphor for
all parts of nature and thought, this ancient image has lost the popular
ity, even dominance, that it possessed during the scientific revolution.
This change, as I have argued, is connected with new developments not
only in science and philosophy but also in the study of language. To a
surprising degree, the governing assumptions of grammar and linguistics
have served as important sources for ways of conceiving and describing
the world. Changes in the way scholars viewed language during the last
half of the seventeenth century increasingly undermined a whole
discourse inspired by the alphabet. In this way, we might say, the
intellectual world itself has constituted a great interconnected "web."
No branch in this world can be viewed as unrelated to the whole
organism of intellectual culture, for changes in one area of thought will
support or undermine the governing assumptions in others. In studying
the shift from the "alphabet" to the "web" of nature, we come to
" See W. Keith Percival, "Linguistic and Biological Classification in the Eighteenth Century,"
in Theodore E. D. Braun, Donald Mell, Jr. and Lucia M. Palmer, Man, God, and Nature in the
Enlightenment (East Lansing: Colleagues Press, 1988), 209. See also P. P. Stevens, "Metaphors
and Typology in the Development of Botanical Systematics 1690-1960, or the Art of Putting
New Wine in Old Bottles," Taxon 33.2 (1984): 169-211.
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understand not only an episode in the history of language or rhetoric,
but more fundamental changes in the way that Western thinkers have
conceived the world.

